Emotions are understood sociologically as experiences of involvement. Emotion regulation influences the type, incidence and expression of emotions. Regulation occurs through physical processes prior to an emotions episode, through social interaction in which a person"s emotions are modified through reactions of others to them, and by a person"s self-modification or management of emotions of which they are consciously aware. The paper goes on to show that there are emotions of which the emoting subject is not consciously aware. A certain class of emotions therefore function by foregrounding external objects of attention while remaining outside the emoting subject"s consciousness as emotions. The nature and significance of such backgrounded emotions beyond explicit emotion regulation are explored through consideration of their role in theory choice in science and in trust relations.
Introduction.
The concept of emotion regulation is as old as considerations of emotions themselves. The most enduring system of thought in human history, devised by Confucius 500 years before Christ, is founded on the idea of the moral education and ritual regulation of emotions. A century later, in ancient Greece, in response to Plato"s concern regarding the dangers of emotional incontinence, Aristotle held that consciousness of emotions provides the means of emotional moderation or regulation. In 17 th century Netherlands Spinoza argued that while passions control those who experience them, in forming an idea of their passions persons free themselves from their grip. Emotion regulation, then, to use a term drawn from modern psychological science, as "the process by which individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express these emotions" (Gross, 1998, p. 275) , is a universal aspect of experience of human emotions. The means by which emotions are thus influenced are numerous and are at least in part distinguished by the disciplinary background of the intellectual traditions which have given attention to emotions and their regulation, as suggested in the following section.
If emotions are to be understood as human experiences through which persons relate to the worlds they inhabit, then "emotion" must refer to the experience of involvement persons have when they participate in those worlds. This involvement includes continuing appraisal or evaluation of the objects of attention and of the emoting subject"s response to those objects. Objects of emotional engagement may be a person, including self, a thing, or an event. Involvement must also include the approach a person takes to an object of their attention, with "approach" meaning not only the way the thing is seen (cognitive approach), but also the manner of movement the emoting subject displays toward it (motivation), as well as the interactional engagement with the object (behavioural or agentic approach). All of these are amenable to sociological apprehension and investigation. What is left out of this statement of emotion are the elements of the human subject"s physical architecture, engineering, circuitry and hydraulics that underlie and facilitate the involvement constitutive of emotion in the sense set out here.
If emotion is the experience of involvement and its cognate attributes then the regulation of emotion is regulation of that experience and not its preconditions in a person"s biological inheritance. To say as much is not to legislate against alternative approaches but to indicate the intention here to illuminate the contribution of a focus on emotions in an understanding of their social processes.
Emotion as experience of involvement yields to regulation in two senses or on two levels. Regulation may be achieved in the interaction between persons so that one"s emotions are modified by the reactions of another to them. This is implicit social regulation of emotions. Second, a person may regulate their own emotions in a social context through processes of self-monitoring. This is explicit social regulation of emotions. In this latter case is a requirement that the emoting subject is consciously aware of the emotions they regulate.
The distinction here between implicit and explicit social regulation of emotions is not intended to cover all possibilities of a person"s direction or adjustment of emotional experience. Much human activity, for instance, is directed to exploration for new experiences. This may occur in tandem with elicitation of a future novel emotional experience or avoidance of what might be regarded as painful or distracting emotional feelings. But a person"s structuring their opportunities in this way, which may influence the positive or negative likelihood of prospective emotions, is not what is meant here by the regulation of emotions. Emotion regulation is conceived sociologically as either the implicit management of current or ongoing emotions, in which case social interaction between persons shapes the emotional experiences of participants through the reactions of others to them. Persons can also explicitly manage their emotions when they feel that an emotional experience is socially inappropriate to the context in which the emotion occurs.
A difference between implicit and explicit emotion regulation indicated here is the degree to which an emoting subject is consciously aware of the emotions which undergo regulation, as emotions. As a matter of fact, some socially significant emotions function without the emoting subject"s consciousness of the emotions in question. Such emotions can only be regulated interactionally or implicitly and never explicitly. Thus there is a category of explicitly non-regulated emotions. Within this category are emotions that have drawn little scholarly or research attention but because of their functional significance deserve serious consideration. Indeed, scientific achievement would be impossible without them and so would cooperation between individuals in trust relations, as shown below.
Sociology, emotions and consciousness.
The structure of the human body, which is the necessary physical basis of emotional experience, imposes limiting conditions on what is possible in the elicitation of emotions. In this sense, then, the central and peripheral nervous systems and the endocrinal system, in particular, provide primary regulation of emotions. The notion of regulation that comes out of neurological and biological concentrations on emotions, then, as regulation through the physical structure and processes of facilitating conditions, is necessarily prior to episodes of actual emotional experiences. What are regulated in these circuits of electrical energy and chemical flows, while essential for understanding emotion at some level, are not yet emotions but what goes to making emotions possible. Emotions arguably occur out of the physical framework of tissues and organs and it is necessarily beyond this point that they are yet to be regulated as emotions.
In the early Hellenic discussion of emotions it was Plato who stood firmly with a wholly physical view of emotions, as pleasure or pain dissociated from thought or knowledge. Aristotle, on the other hand, appreciated that emotions are not merely physical but also cognitive. In his treatment of anger, for instance, in Rhetoric, Aristotle agrees that emotions have a biological component, in this case the physical sensation of pain, but also a complex cognitive component, including perception of an undeserved slight and an intention, namely the desire for revenge. Aristotle saw that the situation that provokes an emotion, as opposed to the physical or biological structure that supports it, is broadly cultural, and so is the intention that an emotion might promote. Indeed, the constructionist approach to emotions, which has enjoyed support over the last three decades among psychologists (Averill, 1980) , philosophers (Armon-Jones, 1985) and sociologists (Shott, 1979) , looks to the way in which the type and intensity of an emotion elicited by an event depends on the emoting subject"s interpretation and evaluation of perception of its circumstance and environment. A good deal of emotion regulation is in the processes through which an emotion is aligned with the particular circumstances of an emoting subject, a process known in sociology as "emotion management" (Hochschild 1983) .
Emotion management, and the "emotional labour" that endeavours to achieve it, cannot be a conclusion to a process but must be a phase of a continuing cycle of activity. Emotion regulation and management, in influencing or producing an emotional experience, typically gives rise to subsequent emotional experiences that may or may not themselves be subjected to regulation or management. A person may "regulate" their anger. Such an endeavour can never stand alone, however, for in managing anger a person may experience pride in their having done so, or a feeling of foolishness for having bothered, or smugness in presenting a self-image that they may feel inauthentic, and so on. Also, it is likely that the regulation of the person"s anger draws on other emotions, such as guilt for getting angry or giving in to it, or pity for the person on the receiving end. The question arises of whether the emotions consequent upon and instrumental in regulation are themselves regulated. There is another approach in sociology which avoids such questions of regulation regression by conceiving emotions in terms of a person"s relations with others (Barbalet, 2001; Kemper, 1978; Scheff, 1990) In this context the psychological and physical processes of feeling state, autonomic arousal, motor expression, cognitive stimulation and so on -which psychologically may be regarded as component parts of an emotion -are sociologically understood as various internal indicators of emotional experience.
Sociologically, emotions may be conceptualized in terms of interactions or relations between persons so that emotions are understood to "result from real, imagined or anticipated outcomes in social relationships" (Kemper, 1978, p. 43) . In their interaction with others persons find that their participation invariably generates a sense of involvement. This involvement may be positive or negative, strong or weak, but in any event it includes an evaluation of the other and the relationship with the other that registers in the person"s physical and dispositional reactions and inclinations. This is what is meant here by an emotion.
Within this framework emotion regulation is internal to the system of interactions and not the province of individual capacities or initiative, as it is defined by Gross (1998) . This is not to say that emotion regulation in this sense is not to be countenanced in sociological terms, for as we have seen regulation is a part of the constructionist approach to emotions. In that case, though, at some point it must be premised on the emoting subject"s consciousness of their emotions. This latter requirement raises significant concerns in the sociological study of emotions. Before justifying this latter claim it is necessary to consider further the sociological approach to emotion regulation as internal to or implicit in the interactions of persons in order to indicate further the sociological perspective on emotions.
A historical perspective on sociological approaches to emotions. The sociological approach to emotions premised on interactions between persons as productive of the full range of human emotions, while given explicit expression in a recent body of literature (Barbalet, 2001; Collins, 2004; Kemper, 1978; Scheff, 1990 Scheff, , 1997 see also Turner, 2009) , is emblematic of a much older tradition. Indeed, in the work of many precursors to the academic discipline of sociology, including Giambattista Vico, Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and Alexis de Tocqueville, for instance, are practical and theoretical acknowledgements of the explanatory power of emotions in understanding social relations and institutions, a concern which did not disappear with the professionalization of sociology in the late 19 th and early 20 th century, and was clearly expressed in the work of Emile Durkheim, Vilfredo Pareto, Ferdinand Tönnies, Georg Simmel, and Edvard Westermarck, to mention only the most obvious writers (see Barbalet, 2001, pp. 8-22; Shilling, 2002) . Even at a time when emotions seemed to have no place in sociological discussion, especially in the United States during the period 1930-1970, absence of a concern with the role of emotions in structuring social relations was never complete (Barbalet, 2001, pp. 16-20) . Perhaps the point can be made by drawing upon a theorist, who is associated with the idea of modern society as manifesting "affective neutrality" (Parsons, 1951) , in indicating a sociological account of emotion regulation as internal to social interactions and relationships. Talcott Parsons argues that the problem of social order is one of a balance between deviance and control: emotional reactions are generated in certain social processes, which other social processes must contain or regulate. For Parsons, social control is not the elimination of deviant factors from the motivational systems of social actors, but the elimination of their consequences: "strains [which may] eventuate in deviant motivation" are endemic in social systems, and strain and deviance are therefore unavoidable and in-eliminable, though containable aspects of social systems (Parsons, 1951, p. 298) . Strain is ever likely because of the impossibility of "pattern consistency" (Parsons and Shils, 1951, pp. 172-3, 175) , that is, impossibility of alignment between the normative system of expectations and the social system of interactions. Strain, Parsons says, provokes anxiety, fantasy, hostility, and defensiveness, and these are or contain emotions disruptive of social order or lead to withdrawal from it, so that control must be directed to "all these elements of the motivational structure" (Parsons, 1951, p. 299) . A significant component of social control, according to this account, will be the suppression of the emotional consequences of strain, which Parsons says is part of "the normal processes of interaction in an institutionally integrated social system" (Parsons, 1951, p. 301) .
Parsons accepts that the normal processes of interaction will include a "limited permissiveness for ... types of emotional expression which would be tabooed in ordinary everyday life", but, in being given limited expression in certain contexts, they become "continuous with the main institutionalized social structure" (Parsons, 1951, p. 306) . Parsons has in mind here such things as youth culture and grief at funeral ceremonies. He returns to these cases in a later discussion, in which he repeats that the function of funeral ceremonies, for instance, is to permit "grief reactions beyond the normal level of emotional demonstrativeness", while at the same time to deny "reciprocity for unduly extreme sentiments of grief" (Parsons, Bales and Shils, 1953, p. 76) . The consistency in this structure of control, Parsons immediately adds, is "to put a premium on "getting back" onto track the resumption of "normal" social functioning" (Parsons, Bales and Shils, 1953, p. 76) . The purpose of social control, in Parsons" schema, then, includes the direct containment of emotions and their managed expression, through which they might dissipate. Here is a clear instance of emotion regulation at the societal level.
Parsons" account is interesting for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the way in which it anticipates aspects of the emotion management argument, such as in Hochschild (1983) , for instance. But whereas emotion management or regulation in the latter writer assumes the knowing involvement of individuals in the process with regard to their own emotions, Parsons" account makes no such assumption and operates instead at the level of interactions between individuals in which a person"s emotions are expressed in their relations with others and regulated by the other"s reactions to them. This regulation is implicit in the social interaction between persons.
If individuals are themselves to regulate their emotions then it is necessary that they be aware of their emotions in an operative sense. This "awareness" might be at a somatic level of automatic and instantaneous neurological or hormonal activity, or at a pre-cognitive cultural level, as when habituation to given norms provokes unthinking and spontaneous reactions that shape or direct incipient arousals. In these instances what is regulated, however, are processes foundational for emotional experiences rather than emotional experiences themselves. The regulation of emergent and felt emotions by those who experience them, on the other hand, requires that the awareness of emotions be a conscious awareness. Consciousness of an emotion permits the person experiencing that consciousness to reflect on the concerns represented by the emotion. In this sense a consciously experienced emotion is objectified and not only does the person experiencing it therefore have an opportunity to examine the emotion but also to process it in both the psychodynamic sense of understanding and coming to terms with the emotion, but also in the constructivist sense of operating on it, shaping or regulating it. This is explicit regulation of emotions. Acknowledgement of emotion regulation in this sense, however, alerts us to the fact that the majority of emotional experiences and certainly some of the most important for social interactions and outcomes are had without the emoting subjects being consciously aware of them.
The proposition to be advanced here, that emotional experiences may occur in the absence of the emoting subject"s consciousness of such experiences, has been explicitly negated (Clore, 1994; LeDoux, 1994 ; but see Lambie and Marcel, 2002) . And yet the idea that emotions provide a form of consciousness of the world, which is accepted here, does not require that in their doing so the emoting subject will necessarily have a consciousness of those emotions. A distinction between emotional consciousness on the one hand, and consciousness of emotions on the other, outlined here (see Barbalet, 2009, pp. 50-62) , can be located in a number of quite different sources, including Jean-Paul Sartre"s phenomenology of emotions (Sartre, 1948) , for instance, Antonio Damasio"s neurological account of a man with real and strong emotions of which he is never aware (Damasio, 2000, pp. 43-7) , and in Thomas Scheff"s sociological treatment of by-passed shame (Scheff, 1988) .
The distinction, between emotions of which the emoting subject is not consciously aware, described above as explicitly non-regulated emotions, and emotions of which the emoting subject is consciously aware, can be amplified by considering another distinction, that between foregrounded and backgrounded emotions (Barbalet, 2001, pp. 59-60 ; see also Lambie and Marcel, 2002, pp. 237-41) . A defining feature of emotions in general is that they reflect a perception of the world from the perspective of the emoting subject"s needs or preferences. Different types of evaluations are entailed in different emotions. The emotions with which we are most familiar are those which draw attention not only to objects and events external to the emoting subject but also to the emoting subject"s internal states. Emotions such as anger, fear, love, disgust, shyness and so on are most effective when the objects of their attention include not only what excites a person"s anger etc but also the person"s internal state, and such emotions thereby promote not only a consciousness of the external object itself but also the subject"s emotional experience of it.
An entirely different class of emotions, which typically have relatively low expressivity and weak physiological correlates, function by giving attention to external but not internal objects of emotional apprehension. Such emotions are found in experience of aesthetic pleasure, for instance, in which reflective rather than active involvement is required. Indeed, this may be a key element in the distinction between foregrounded and backgrounded emotions. While all emotions are in principle delinked from action, foregrounded emotions typically entail characteristic dispositional programs in which the possibility of action consequent upon them is an element in their meaning. Experience of fear, for instance, does not necessarily lead to flight or fight, but the possibility of these associated behaviours is integral to what is meant by fear. A characteristic feature of backgrounded emotions, on the other hand, is the relative absence of a behavioural concomitant and a high intellectual or reflective component.
Backgrounded emotions, emotions of which emoting subjects are not consciously aware and therefore are explicitly non-regulated, are essential in social relations in which intellectual discernment is required but evidentiary determination is not possible, in which interactional engagements are premised on assessments of a range of more or less equivalently (positive or negative) attractive possibilities. In the following discussion two such possibilities will be considered in which the apprehension of an appropriate way to proceed is selected by an emotional experience of a choice between different courses of action that are each equally supported by "the facts". The first of these relates to theory choice in science and the second to trust decisions in cooperative social relations.
Aesthetic joy and theory choice in science
A frequently encountered problem in scientific research concerns choices that have to be made regarding what particular direction would move a piece of research forward, but for which sound reasons exist for a number of different options or possibilities. Under such circumstances closure cannot be achieved by appeal to the facts because the alternative possibilities will each typically draw on credible factual support. An important treatment of this issue is Thomas Kuhn"s resolution of the problem of "theory choice" through an appeal to values (Kuhn, 1977) . This approach, however, must be regarded as at least incomplete, for Kuhn says that values "influence" but do not "determine" choice (Kuhn, 1977, p. 331) . It will be shown here that not values but emotions, especially those that constitute aesthetic pleasure, explicate the issue of theory choice.
It should be noted that scientists themselves frequently appeal not to values but to beauty -aesthetic pleasure -when faced with theory choice, even though they seldom if ever report the related emotions in their scientific publications, a matter that has led one scientist to ask: "is the scientific paper a fraud?" (Medawar, 1991 ; see also Hoffman, 1988) . One reason why aesthetic pleasure as part of a decision mechanism is not incorporated in research findings is the assumption that such feelings are entirely personal and therefore lack the qualities appropriate to sustain research. And yet implicit in the notion of a scientific community, for instance, is the possibility that experience of aesthetic pleasure is not merely private and idiosyncratic but is rather an outcome of consistency of social milieu (Fleck, 1979; Hagstrom, 1965) . Indeed the importance of training and experience to scientific cognition (Ziman, 1978) further suggests a basis of convergence of aesthetic judgement in scientific communities and its possible application to scientific decision making (see Krohn, 2006) .
Aesthetic experience has a number of elements, of which the emotional component is the most obvious. A second element, that reinforces the backgrounded nature of aesthetic pleasure, is the intellectual component of aesthetic experience. This aspect is inherent in aesthetic pleasure because such experiences are disinterested in the sense that they arise from focus on an object"s appearance or structure. As a consequence of disinterested concentration the aesthetic object"s instrumental or practical attributes are placed out of focus. In this way the intrinsic properties of external objects, rather than the emoting subject"s internal processes, are emotionally apprehended in aesthetic pleasure. This raises, then, the question of the phenomenal object of the emotional-intellectual pleasure that derives from aesthetic experience, to which we now turn.
The aesthetic object is never a thing in itself, but refers instead to an arrangement of things or parts, or to a perspective that permits a view of arrangements. At the heart of aesthetic experience, and the source of joy that accompanies it, is perception of characteristic organization or form in an apparent disconnection or even chaos of parts. Aesthetic experience, then, arises through perception of a particular type of organization of elements that realizes certain values. To this extent Kuhn is correct to point to the role of values in theory choice. The values integral to aesthetic experience have been identified by Maslow, for instance, as wholeness, uniqueness, and aliveness (quoted in Kemper, 1979, pp. 303) . Within the context of scientific endeavours, the appreciation of such values will be inherent in the structure of the thought collective, to use Fleck"s (1979) term, or the ethos of the scientific community. Indeed, the experiential basis of scientific cognition necessarily includes a practical specification of precisely those values central to such aesthetic experience.
Aesthetic experience, then, is a response to the realization of the values characterized here as wholeness, uniqueness, and aliveness, in the circumstances of scientific research and decision-making. In other words, aesthetic experience is a response to a correspondence between these values of the scientific thought collective and the conditions encountered in a particular research episode. The attainment of correspondence between values and condition is the circumstance that evokes aesthetic pleasure and especially the emotion of joy. Kuhn"s reference to mere values is therefore insufficient in so far as the efficacy of values in scientific choice is through the role of emotions in signalling correspondence between values and conditions in aesthetic experiences.
The conditions have now been specified in which values can be regarded, as Kuhn suggests, as a guide for action through ambiguous situations. That a scientist realizes her values is a necessarily desirable event, in which satisfaction, indeed joy, is inherent. This is the point: the experience of joy, which is the affective force of all aesthetic experience, is the emotional expression of the realization of values, of attaining a correspondence between the values which guide a scientist"s choice and the conditions that that scientist encounters and perceives. In signalling a perception of correspondence between values and conditions aesthetic joy is precipitated as a feeling of self-actualization and meaningfulness in a person"s activities, indeed, in their being (de Rivera, 1977, p. 64) . It can be noted, given the frequently referred to role of wonder in scientific discovery, from Aristotle to Descartes, to Einstein, to Edward O. Wilson, that joy and wonder have been described as parallel emotions (de Rivera, 1977, p. 66 ).
The aesthetic experience, then, in the context of scientific choice, is an emotional apprehension of one possibility of action or direction over others on the basis of a felt realization of pertinent values in one set of conditions or practices and their absence in alternative conditions or practices. That this is an emotional apprehension of choice reflects the nature of scientific choice. It must be emphasized that these latter arise when "there is always at least some good reasons for each possible choice" (Kuhn, 1977, p. 328) . The question of choice arises not because there is an absence of evidence for one finding or theory as against others, but because there is evidence for all, and therefore an absence of determining evidence. The necessity of aesthetic emotion in joy is therefore unavoidable in such circumstances in the development and progress of science. Because the emotions involved are backgrounded they direct the scientist"s conscious awareness not to the emotions in question but only to the objects that those emotions apprehend.
Through the emotions within scientific activity the scientist is aware of the objects the emotions bring to consciousness, even though the emotions do not draw attention to themselves, are not in the first instance consciously experienced as emotions. An extremely astute observer, the plant morphologist Agnes Arber, has captured something of this:
It is not possible to offer strict scientific evidence for the idea that not only reason but emotion has a function in biological discovery … we can only point to slight indications which are at least compatible with its truth. It is recognized, for instance, that the moment at which a fruitful combination of ideas enters the awareness, is often charged with a particular feeling of joy, which precedes and seems independent of, the rational satisfaction of goalattainment (Arber, 1954, pp. 20-1) . The joy that Arber refers to is not the motivational joy exterior to science that comes with the satisfaction of any job well done. It is an emotional basis of activity interior to science. Neither is this joy register of the conclusion of a piece of scientific work, but the affective mechanism that allows it to continue toward its conclusion. Michael Polanyi similarly argues that emotions "have a logical function which contributes an indispensable element to science" (Polanyi, 1974, p. 134) . Like Arber, Polanyi trained as a scientist and each of their statements regarding the importance of "scientific emotions" can therefore be regarded as conclusions of participant observation. Aesthetic joy brings closure to scientific decision-making because, in Polanyi"s words, it "distinguish[es] between demonstrable facts which are of scientific interest, and those which are not … [and] also ... [guides] assessment of what is of higher and what of lesser interest" (Polanyi, 1974, p. 135 ).
The relevant emotions are able to discriminate between relevant and irrelevant objects of scientific concern, and underlie the scientist"s consciousness of those objects, because they are not principally experienced consciously as emotions. Any explicit regulation of such emotions would negate their role in distinguishing facts that Polanyi says are of "scientific interest" and assessing the degree of that interest. It is possible to pursue further these attributes of backgrounded and explicitly nonregulated emotions by considering an additional case in which similar emotions are necessary to a process of much significance for social organization, namely trust.
Confidence in trust.
Trust is a means of overcoming the absence of evidence concerning the future behaviour of a partner or partners in cooperative activity. A person will know whether their trusting another will lead to the outcome they anticipate only after the trust has been given. As the basis of trust is located in the choice of the trust giver to depend on another in spite of an absence of information concerning the outcome of that dependency, then any satisfactory account of trust must be premised on an account of the mechanism underlying such a choice.
Trust, as a modality of action requiring a commitment to act in the absence of evidence concerning its outcome, involves both emotional apprehension and emotional engagement. Something of the form of this aspect of trust is described in William James" account of the "Alpine climber", in which an actor"s particular emotional commitment leads to an unambiguous and singular material outcome in selection of strategy in the absence of relevant evidence (James, 1956, pp. 96-7) : an Alpine climber trapped on a narrow and icy precipice can escape serious difficulty only by executing a dangerous leap she had not previously performed. Engaged by confidence and hope the climber is likely to perform a feat otherwise impossible. Fear and despondency, on the other hand, will lead to hesitation, through which the climber may miss her footing and possibly fall to her death. Whichever emotions are engaged, and therefore whichever non-deliberative "choice" is taken, will be commensurate with a particular outcome, but with contrastingly different consequences. This account touches issues concerning trust by showing how the problem of absent information in an action decision is overcome by emotional commitment to a course of action which realizes an expectation or produces a future it anticipates.
Before considering the emotional basis of trust it is appropriate to say something further about emotion in general. Emotions are conventionally characterized as highly visceral outbursts of short duration, such as reactive anger or fear. But not all emotions are highly labile and disruptive. Some may be calm and organizing, such as the emotions of satisfaction, for instance, regret, and also aesthetic joy, as shown above. Another misunderstanding concerning emotion that we have already touched on holds that those who experience emotions are necessarily conscious of them, and aware of them as emotions. They need not be, as we have seen. Corrective of the idea that emotions are only disordering psycho-somatic processes is the observation that emotions have cognitive and evaluational functions (Nussbaum, 2003; Oatley, 1992) . If emotions underscore values, interests and meanings in social life, then they are implicated in rational as well as irrational conduct and outlook, and the distinction between rational action and emotional action looses its relevance when emotion is seen to underlie all action (Barbalet, 2001, pp. 29-61) . The question is then which particular emotions are implicated in distinct types of social interaction or processes.
The emotional elements underlying trust may be calm, unobtrusive and in that sense consonant with rationality. Trust requires a positive feeling of expectation regarding another"s future actions. But the expectation is not disinterested as the other"s future actions will effectively impact on the trust giver"s wellbeing even though they have no control over the other"s freedom of action. Trust is supported, then, by a feeling that one can rely on, be dependent on another. Each of these feelings, of positive expectation and safe dependency, is a variant or application of confidence. Confidence is not the same as trust, not because of a difference in the degree of certainty attached to each (Misztal 1996: 16) , but because of a difference of attribution between them (Luhmann 1990: 97) : confidence relates to contingent events and trust to the subject"s own engagements. But the logical distinction between them makes it possible to say that "trust implies confidence" (Rose-Ackerman 2001: 526; see also Giddens 1990: 34) . The basis of trust, then, is the feeling of confidence in another"s future actions and also confidence concerning one"s own judgement of another.
In discussing emotions it is necessary to overcome both the ambiguities and silences in everyday language concerning emotional states and experiences. One resolution of this problem, which permits a clear exposition of the emotional basis of trust, for instance, distinguishes between "emotion tokens" and "emotion types", the former referring to ordinary language words for emotional states and the latter referring to characterizations of emotional states "in terms of their cognitive eliciting conditions" (Ortony, Clore and Collins, 1988, p. 173) . The cognitive eliciting conditions of confidence are "approving of one"s own assured expectation". The object of confidence is thus not primarily self or other, as with many emotions, such as shame (a negative self-regarding emotion) or love (a positive other-regarding emotion), but expectation of the future. Along with security, depression, and anxiety confidence is therefore an "anticipatory emotion" (Kemper, 1978, p. 72) . Like all emotions, confidence has not only a phenomenal form and psychological tone, but also a social basis which includes acceptance and recognition, and the resources to which these provide access, as various elucidations of confidence as an emotion reveal (Barbalet, 2001, pp. 84-90; Kemper, 1978, pp. 73-7; de Rivera, 1977, pp. 45-51) .
The type specification of confidence underlying trust is "approving of one"s own assured expectation regarding another"s reliability". It is important to understand trust in terms of the trust giver"s self-reference and not principally in terms of the other"s qualities. Trust is not "appreciation", for instance, the cognitive eliciting conditions of which are "approving of someone else"s praiseworthy action". This is because trust is given before the other"s relevant action can be known or appraised. Neither is trust a mere prospect-based emotion like "hope", for example, the cognitive eliciting condition of which is "pleased about the prospect of a desirable event". This is because hope springs eternal whereas confidence and trust are conditional on a selfbased capacity for assessment of expectation.
The significance of this latter aspect of trust is in the fact that when trust is broken there is not only generation of other-directed emotions, such as anger against the trust breaker, but also self-reproach and self-blame. This is what Luhmann refers to when he says that trust involves "an internal attribution" and the possibility that one may "regret [one"s] trusting choice" (Luhmann 1990: 98) . The mistrust of a betrayed trust giver may prevent their trusting even those who are not only beyond reproach in general terms but would have met the subjective criteria of the betrayed prior to their betrayal. Broken trust reflects not only on the trust breaker but principally on the judgement of the trust giver.
Self-reference to the judgement of the trust giver is as central to trust as the qualities of the trust taker. Because trust is based upon feelings of expectation and confidence, the trustworthiness of the trust taker can never be more than a part of the context of trust giving, and is only real when subjectively accepted by the trust giver.
The context in which trust is given includes, therefore, the qualities of the trust taker, including their reputation, self-presentation, certified qualifications and so on. But this context can never provide conclusive grounds for trust and never constitute sufficient evidence for the reasonableness of trust when it is given. A person"s trust of another will always be interactively generated not only in terms of perceptions of trustworthiness that might support a feeling of acceptance of dependence but principally in terms of feelings of confidence in the actor"s own capacities to form judgements or assessments of others and their future actions. Thus decisions to trust emerge as negotiated, internally reflexive and possibly idiosyncratic meanings. It is this aspect of trust that frustrates construction of a purely formal account of it, especially in terms of the other"s trustworthiness.
Like all emotions, the confidence on which trust rests is contextual and conditional. An essential feature of emotions, including the emotional basis of trust, is a dual process of non-deliberative appraisal. These are, appraisal of the object of the emotion, what it means to the emoting subject, and also appraisal of the subject"s own needs, capacities, and possible action strategies or responses in relation to the object. The confidence implicit in trust, though, is likely to be background to the object of trustworthiness it assesses: it is an emotion that promotes consciousness of the other"s prospective conduct rather than the emotions of the trust-giver, except when it is broken.
Like the emotions of aesthetic pleasure which underlie theory choice in science, the feelings of confidence upon which trust rests are explicitly non-regulated emotions as the emotional salience of self assessment in them is backgrounded in the attention to the object of dependence upon which trust is based. Broken trust, however, leads to emotional experiences in which the emotionality of trust in the selfassessing component of confidence is foregrounded and the explicit regulation of the emotions involved then becomes a manifest prospect. Such a possibility only serves to reinforce the characterisation of the underlying confidence necessary to trust as an instance of explicitly non-regulated emotion.
Conclusion.
The sociological province of emotions, it has been shown above, conceives emotion regulation as the implicit management of emotions through social interaction between persons whose emotional experiences are thus shaped by the reactions of others to them. Emotion regulation also occurs in the explicit management of their emotions by persons when they attempt to contain, constrain, direct, transform or otherwise manipulate their emotions. Such regulation is typically undertaken when an emoting subject feels that an emotional experience, either in its specific content or intensity, contravenes prevailing norms or is otherwise inappropriate to the context in which the experience of the emotion episode occurs. One distinction between the implicit and explicit forms of emotion regulation mentioned here is the extent of the emoting subject"s conscious awareness of the emotions subjected to regulation as emotions. Implicit emotion regulation, because it occurs at the level of interaction between persons, does not require consciousness of the relevant emotions as emotions, whereas explicit emotion regulation does require such consciousness in the emoting subject.
This focus on emotion regulation and the distinction drawn here between implicit and explicit regulation raises a question concerning the reach of each form of regulation. There are emotional experiences which have characteristics that make them more -or less -amenable to or available for regulation of one type rather than another. The question was not asked in the present paper about the characteristics of emotional experiences that escape implicit regulation, that are not subject to regulation in the interaction between persons. This is an area deserving future consideration. The concern of the present paper, on the other hand, has been with those emotions that are arguably less amenable to strategic or explicit regulation because they not only have low expressivity but also because the persons who experience them are unlikely to be conscious of them as emotions. And yet these explicitly non-regulated emotions are essential to the capacities and capabilities of the human agents who experience them, and permit explanation of crucial social processes, including scientific discovery and trust relations, as shown above.
In commissioning papers the editor of this special issue posed two questions to provide a common framework for contributions: How do theories or assumptions about the nature of emotion shape research on emotion regulation? How does research on emotion regulation inform and enrich our understanding of emotion? This paper has addressed the first question. In doing so it was mentioned but not elaborated that both implicit and explicit emotion regulation, in modifying emotional experiences, unavoidably generate other emotional experiences. It was also suggested that emotions themselves are a means of regulation of other emotions. The consequent iteration of emotions and the formation of nested emotions are therefore two connected processes that may be better understood through research on emotion regulation only touched on in the present paper. As well as emotions that are subject to regulation, and emotions beyond regulation, emotion regulation generates collateral emotions. Here emotion regulation opens a field to enrich our understanding of emotions.
